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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
WASTE MANAGEMENT
FOREWORD BY
WILLIAM D. JORDAN*
Environmental protection law did not really emerge among the re-
cent phenomena of our civilization. Many passages from the Bible or
the Code of Hammurabi arguably represent the ancient predecessors
of our efforts in this area. For example, the incineration of infectious
waste, described in Leviticus 13:47-52 as a religious ritual and public
health measure, remains one of the most preferred waste manage-
ment techniques more than three thousand years after it was first de-
scribed by Moses.
Although one can trace through time a continuous evolution in
waste management regulations, Congress recently enacted three
laws-the Water Pollution Control Act,' the Clear Air Act' and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 3-which represented a sig-
nificant departure from the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition called prece-
dence. To understand this one must examine the meaning of "law"
from the layman's perspective.
* Department of Environmental Health and Safety, Harvard Medical School,
Boston, Massachusetts. In addition to his duties as a safety engineer at the Medical
School, Mr. Jordan serves as the general coordinator for all hazardous waste activities
at Harvard University.
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976), as amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-65 (Supp. III 1979).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571(1970),amendedandrecodfedat 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642
(Supp. III 1979).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-84 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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A. The Esthetics of Environmental Protection Law
Most people who are not legal experts view the "law" as a great
mass of written rules that establishes acceptable behavior between
humans. In contrast, what our environmental protection laws regu-
late is the relationship between humans and their environment. Spe-
cifically, environmental protection laws-in particular, the triad of
statutes mentioned above--deal with the physical, chemical, and bio-
logical characteristics of our surroundings. To be sure, these laws are
concerned about physical injury to humans or their property, and
penalties are prescribed for the transgressor. But underlying these
environmental protection laws is a more philosophical element-a
concern for esthetics, those non-tangible aspects of our surroundings
that contribute to the quality of all life and not just human life.
Supporting this contention is the proposition that the water pollu-
tion, air pollution, and solid waste disposal laws4 directly relate to the
National Environmental Policy Act.' This Act requires that any
significant human activity in the United States be held in abeyance
until its environmental impact is determined to be acceptable. By
Congressional mandate, this is not to be limited solely to the effect
some proposed activity may have upon humans. The required docu-
mentation-the environmental impact statement-must contain,
whenever appropriate, an assessment of any deleterious effect upon
the surrounding air, water and land. The corresponding environ-
mental protection laws6 either set specific technical standards against
which these effects are to be measured or establish procedures by
which a governmental agency may promulgate such standards. In
any event, the pervasive theme throughout the body of environmen-
tal protection law is a fundamental concern for esthetics.
Two problems inhere in this concern for esthetics. The first in-
volves how the collective citizenry (when assembled in an administra-
tive or legislative convocation) decides when enough is enough (an
issue invariably known as the "cost-benefit" debate). The second
pertains to how that same citizenry (when assembled in a judicial
proceeding) decides that a legal transgression has occurred and that
penalties of some sort are in order. The resolution of these problems
4. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Id., is actually the solid waste
disposal (i.e., land pollution) part of the triad referenced above.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976).
6. Id
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will be the single most important determinant affecting the viability
of existing and future environmental legislation. This resolution has
just begun under the prodding of a new President whose economic
policy explicitly demands what environmentalists consider a whole-
sale dismantling of much of the regulatory system.
B. The Cost-Benefit Debate
The advocates of deregulation claim that existing environmental
laws have been ineffective and that they have diverted capital into
non-productive areas so as to place American business at a competi-
tive disadvantage. These claims bear some examination since de-
regulation will, of course, affect the environment and may not make
business more competitive. An experienced observer will affirm that
Cartesian logic does not always apply to such actions. The revoca-
tion of a law or regulation perceived as onerous often has unexpected
effects.
Just how effective (or ineffective) have environmental laws been?
The answer, of course, depends on how one measures effectiveness.
In terms of the total amounts of pollutants emitted into the environ-
ment, there have been some notable improvements. For example,
based on information from the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) the combined emissions of carbon monoxide and nitrogen ox-
ides from passenger cars and taxis decreased from about eighty-five
grams per vehicle per mile driven in the 1960's (i.e., prior to the 1970
Clean Air Act) to about fifty-one grams per vehicle per mile driven in
1981 (when emission controls were really effective).7 The steps taken
to reduce emissions also resulted in average vehicle gas mileage de-
creasing from about 14.3 miles per gallon in 1960 to 13.5 miles per
gallon in 1975.8 Subsequent federal requirements for greater fuel ef-
ficiency demonstrate, however, that decreased emissions do not have
to result in decreased performance elsewhere.
Similar improvements demonstrate the recent progress made to-
ward bringing other environmental problems under control. Accord-
ing to the EPA, total air pollution emissions from all sources
(transportation, industrial, etc.) decreased between 1970 and 1974.
These include an eighteen percent reduction in carbon monoxide, an
7. Bennett, Why the Clean AirAct Needs Adjustment, 7 E.P.A.J., No. 9, 8 (1981).
8, All statistics in this Forward are derived from the HAMMOND ALMANAC (1980);
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1980).
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eight and one half percent reduction in sulfur oxides, a five percent
reduction in hydrocarbons, and nearly a thirty percent reduction in
particulates. While nitrogen oxides were a disappointment (an in-
crease of little over ten percent), the quantity emitted into the atmos-
phere was more than offset by reductions in the other pollutants, for
an overall reduction of about ten and one half percent between 1970
and 1974 for the five pollutants just mentioned.
The picture for many other environmental problems appears am-
biguous, or even discouraging. For example, according to the United
States Coast Guard the pollution of United States waterways (which
includes coastal waters as well as lakes, rivers, etc.) by oil increased
slightly from about fifteen million gallons in 1970 to nearly seventeen
million in 1974, then decreased to slightly less than fifteen million
gallons in 1975. And the dumping of industrial waste on or in the
soil itself has become a near disaster, as will be discussed in some of
the following articles. Still the fact remains that there has been a
partial improvement in the environment. The Atlantic Salmon has
begun to return to the rivers of Maine and the Sockeye Salmon has
reappeared in the streams and rivers around Washington's Puget
Sound. The Peregrine Falcon has made a small but very significant
return to the New Jersey meadows. Many urbanized rivers, such as
the Charles in Boston or the Harlem in New York City, are no longer
the foul sewers they once were. Such events should be greeted with
joy, since they are sensitive indicators of a change in our previous
depredatory attitude toward our environment. Thus, the qualitative
and quantitative evidence does not lend credence to the claim that
environmental laws have not been effective.
If anything, the modest improvements seen, coupled with the blunt
evidence that much of the environment still remains despoiled,
should prompt a more vigorous commitment to continue, and im-
prove, the efforts made so far. Certainly, the environmental damage
accumulated through decades of neglect or outright misuse cannot be
mended in a year or two. Some pollutants are not biodegradable.
For example, non-biodegradable polychlorinated biphenyls, (PCB's)
were not banned until nearly forty years after their 1929 introduction
to the electric power generation industry. In the interim, literally
millions of tons of PCB's have accumulated at the bottom of rivers
and in the soil. Removal and disposal of this accumulation by high
temperature incineration will require unprecedented effort. On the
basis of scientific or technical grounds it is clearly premature to aban-
don this effort.
[Vol. 22:317
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What about the criticism based on economic grounds? Many ar-
gue that environmental protection costs too much, the costs outweigh
the benefits or the necessary investment is non-productive or, more
emotionally, jobs will be lost because American industry cannot com-
pete with foreign industry. According to the Department of Com-
merce, the export of American goods and services has regularly
exceeded imports for at least the last eighty years. The sole excep-
tions to this have occurred in the last decade or so and are primarily
the result of sharp increases in the price of imported oil produced by
the OPEC cartel. Although these distortions have caused economic
havoc, oil imports still represent but a fraction of the total U.S. for-
eign trade. Indeed, on several occasions, American exports have ac-
tually offset OPEC-controlled imports and have produced a trade
surplus.
Even more compelling is that fact that some of the primary targets
of environmental legislation-the manufacturers of basic chemicals,
fertilizers and plastics-have consistently produced exports that have
exceeded similar imports, often by a factor of two to one in dollar
value. The same is more or less true of other industries (machinery,
computers, aircraft, medicines, etc.) as well as agriculture. During
the last thirty years, the United States, with about five percent of the
world's population, has been responsible for twelve to seventeen per-
cent of the world's exports. Apparently, large numbers of American
businesses manage to do quite well in the international marketplace.
So, what is the basis for the claim that environmental legislation
makes American industry non-competitive? The ostensible answer
lies in the economic problems now assaulting a small number of very
large companies which, because of their size, affect virtually all the
rest.
It is indisputable that the steel and automotive industries are in
very big trouble, both domestically and internationally. The dollar
value of United States imports of iron and steel products often ex-
ceeds exports by a factor of nearly ten to one. While the exports of
some types of transportation equipment, such as railway and aircraft,
do very well, the importation of foreign-made passenger automobiles
has become so huge that the overall dollar value of imported trans-
portation equipment now exceeds exports by as much as a factor of
two to one each year. According to the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association, imported automobiles have increased from 11.7 percent
19811
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of the American market in 1969, to 21.8 percent in 1978.9
But is this increase in automobile imports due, in any significant
part, to environmental legislation? The evidence suggests that other
factors have far more significance. Imported cars must conform to
exactly the same safety and pollution regulations as the domestic
ones. Such requirements are based on human safety or ecological
criteria that are generally independent of vehicle size. Therefore,
regulatory costs are usually proportionately higher for the smaller
and lower-priced imported automobile. It is difficult to believe that
the ills of the auto industry are due to environmental legislation.
The same doubts apply to the problems of the steel industry. The
industry is economically sick not only in the United States, but also
in such other highly industrialized nations as Great Britain and
France. The most likely reason for the poor competitive position of
steel is that it is produced by a "mature" industry having an easily
transferred technology. Producers can, and do, build steel mills any-
where since their construction and operation no longer require eso-
teric technical knowledge. Under such conditions, lower
manufacturing costs (especially wages), union work rules, monetary
interest rates, discriminatory import duties, direct or indirect export
subsidies, and differing antitrust laws (if any) become the significant
economic factors in plant siting. Changing our environmental pro-
tection laws would do little to compensate for these factors.
What about the claim that environmental legislation diverts invest-
ment into non-productive areas? In the last one hundred years, the
only major technological innovations in the manufacture of steel
have been the basic oxygen process (BOP) and the continuous casting
of steel slabs. Interestingly enough, not only are these processes more
labor efficient, they are also more energy efficient and less occupa-
tionally and environmentally dangerous than the open hearth or Bes-
semer furnaces and ingot-rolling mills they replace. Instead of taking
advantage of these technical innovations, the steel industry suggests
that the lifetime of existing equipment should be extended by dis-
pensing with anti-pollution controls such antiquated processes would
otherwise require.'"
9. The current figure for 1981 is now running well over 30 percent according to
verbal information from the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association in Washing-
ton, D.C.
10. Current interest rates (exceeding 20% at times) obviously militate against ei-
ther of these alternatives. However, the technical innovations mentioned were avail-
[Vol. 22:317
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol22/iss1/12
WASTE MANAGEMENT
In a parallel fashion, the only recent innovation in automobile
manufacturing has been the introduction of computerized, industrial
robots. While robots probably offer negligible environmental advan-
tages, they do have a significant potential for reducing occupational
hazards along with manufacturing costs. Yet, only reluctantly have
American auto makers begun to use them, preferring instead to seek
government-backed loans, deferred or reduced employee wages and
benefits, and favorable tariffs and import quotas. Again, it is hard to
understand how environmental deregulation could possibly offset
such self-inflicted economic wounds.
Still, even if legislation does divert investment from the steel or
automobile industries, then one also must recognize that this process
does have benefits. The diverted capital is most certainly being put to
use. It pays for the design and manufacture of smoke precipitators,
sewerage treatment plants and other anti-pollution devices. It gener-
ates jobs and provides wages. The new and relatively unexploited
technical field it now supports has an enormous potential that is only
just beginning to be realized. Thus the diverted capital may eventu-
ally employ far more people in these new industries.
Another factor to consider is the previously mentioned non-Carte-
sian consequences of revoking laws. During the last thirty years one
of the most significant factors in the persistent deficit in the United
States balance of payments--as contrasted to the balance of trade-
has been the unrestrained export of American capital. The export of
private and corporate money often exceeds the amount of money ex-
ported by our government for foreign and military aid. I Among the
most proffigate practitioners of overseas capital investment are the
American automakers. Were environmental deregulation to occur,
there is no assurance that they would reinvest any corresponding sav-
ings into American-based plants. At the same time deregulation
would presumably free up the cash flow of foreign automakers who
compete in the American market place, thus giving the American
companies no particular advantage. These considerations would
seem, by themselves, to justify retaining present anti-pollution
controls.
The current debate over the costs versus benefits of environmental
able long before the rates reached such levels. It is questionable that the present
consequences of such inertia is likely to be alleviated by deregulating environmental
laws since these antiquated processes would still be uncompetitive.
11. See note 7 supra.
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legislation invariably seems to focus only on the costs, primarily the
economic ones. Indeed, Douglas Fraser, President of the United Au-
tomobile Workers, was recently quoted as saying, "In a just society,
we [the UAW] would welcome a cost-benefit approach. . . but under
the current system, all that cost-benefit analysis represents is an at-
tempt by business and industry groups to fight the adoption of
needed regulations and to avoid spending money on safer working
conditions."'" While Mr. Fraser's comments were directed at at-
tempts to change workplace safety laws, the observation equally ap-
plies to environmental legislation. Yet, it was never the intent of the
Congress to limit regulatory consideration solely to economic costs or
benefits. Indeed, for certain activities (such as workplace safety
rules), Congress specifically prohibited consideration of cost since
safety was to receive the paramount priority.
The environmental impact statement that must accompany all ma-
jor public works projects-and, depending on individual state laws,
many private projects as well-requires that some attempt be made
to quantify non-economic costs and benefits. Unfortunately, this has
sometimes met only with partial success because an impartial meas-
ure of such phenomenon as scenic mountain views is difficult to for-
mulate. In addition, the public's ephemeral support for such
attempts often remains limited to what can be readily seen, smelled,
or felt without the aid of scientific instruments. The reduction of visi-
ble industrial haze is invariably viewed as beneficial but does not by
itself alleviate other environmental hazards. Thus, environmentalists
face not only the chore of refocusing the current debate away from
purely economic factors, but also the job of developing public sup-
port for controls on the remaining environmental hazards that are
not so obvious as belching smokestacks or odiferous rivers.
C. Judicial Enforcement
As stated at the outset, the resolution of the cost-benefit debate is
only one problem inherent in our legal concern with esthetics. The
judicial process for determining that environmental legislation has
been overstepped represents the other principal problem. This cen-
ters around the quality of the evidentiary showing needed to prove a
violation. It is here that the influence of the legal profession will
probably have the greatest impact. In the courtroom the dichotomy
12. 43 Occupational Hazards, No. 10, 34, (1981).
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between the scientist's and the layman's perception of cause and ef-
fect is often resolved to the satisfaction of no one. The confusion
caused by these differing perceptions is manifest in several examples
involving the disposal of hazardous waste. Notable is the now noto-
rious Love Canal episode and the less-well-known, but equally divi-
sive, Woburn Dump episode in Massachusetts.
In the Love Canal episode the EPA attempted to buttress a $124.5
million lawsuit against the Hooker Chemical Company by demon-
strating that a number of people living near the dumpsite had suf-
fered chromosomal damage. An EPA sponsored study, publicly
released on May 17, 1981, appeared to substantiate the EPA claim
that the Love Canal residents and their children may be subject to an
increased risk of cancer and birth defects because of Hooker's activi-
ties. Then, barely ten days later, the EPA abruptly withdrew the re-
port because a panel of eight scientists reviewing the study concluded
it had no value and could not be salvaged.' 3 The dispute between the
investigator who performed the original study and those who subse-
quently reviewed it was complex, and included a number of non-
scientific issues (such as the makeup of the review panel, etc.). Yet, to
the non-expert, this was another example of two presumably equally
qualified experts--or group of experts-looking at the same evidence
and arriving at completely opposite opinions.
Somewhat different issues arose in the Woburn, Massachusetts epi-
sode. The so-called "Woburn Dump" is actually a collection of more
than a dozen different disposal sites where a wide variety of indus-
trial wastes were deposited over a period of more than one hundred
years. The complex mixture of wastes that were deposited in this rel-
atively small, if non-contiguous, set of geographical areas included
many materials known to be highly toxic since antiquity. Disposal of
these hazardous wastes was typically no different from the disposal of
ordinary domestic trash. Some materials were merely thrown into
the back yard.
In 1979, the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality
Engineering (DEQE) closed several wells in the area that supplied a
portion of the town's water because the wells were contaminated with
a half dozen or more toxic solvents and hazardous metals. At the
same time, through the persistent efforts of a local minister, it was
discovered that the residents of this same area suffered from an un-
13. See 208 Science, No. 4449, 1239 (1980).
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usually high incidence of adult renal cancer and childhood leukemia.
The public, quite understandably, concluded that a casual link ex-
isted between the water contamination and occurrence of these
diseases.
Subsequently, a number of inconsistent factors were also discov-
ered. For example, no unequivocal correlation could be found be-
tween the materials located in the various dumpsites and those found
in the abandoned wells. Since the wellwater was definitely contami-
nated, this simply meant that the actual source remained to be dis-
covered, a fact that was not especially alarming in itself. More
distressing, however, was the discovery that although some of the
wellwater contaminants were known (or suspect) carcinogens, they
did not, so far as was then (or now) known, manifest themselves in
the types of cancers actually observed in the exposed population. In
a report issued by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health
(DPH) the conclusions stated that while the incidence of childhood
leukemia and adult renal cancer had significantly increased during
the period under investigation (1969-1978), no association with the
observed environmental hazards could be either proven or dis-
proven.' 4 The report then suggested that further investigation into
other types of lymphatic diseases and cancer as well as positive deter-
mination of the still unknown source of the contaminants actually
found might eventually reveal some sort of valid correlation. 15
These examples are not exclusive or unique. The scientific and
technical literature contains numerous other examples of first, the
subjective nature of many scientific observations, and second, the
wide gap between what the scientist and the layman consider ade-
quate proof. Yet these apparent discrepancies are more of degree
rather than kind, and once understood ought not cause further
confusion.
14. G. PARKER & S. ROSEN, WOBURN CANCER INCIDENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
HAZARDS 1969-1978 (Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Boston, MA, Jan-
uary 23, 1981).
15. On November 18, 1981, just before this article went to press, a Boston radio
Station (WEEI) broadcast a news item stating that the Massachusetts DPH had found
there was now no correlation between the contaminated wells and the cancer found in
Woburn because the cancer incidents occured before the wells were contaminated.
The news broadcast did not mention whether some other type of correlation might
have been discovered, but even if such a relationship is eventually found, this episode
is a perfect illustration of the immense difficulty of trying to demonstrate cause and
effect in epidemiological studies.
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In the Massachusetts DPH study of the "Woburn Dump", the sig-
n4qcant incidence of renal cancer and leukemia was defined exclu-
sively in terms of statistical significance. The study disclosed the
types of statistical tests used to examine the data and determined that
the study's conclusions were supported by a high level of statistical
confidence-ninety-five percent. What this means is that there was a
ninety-five percent, or better, chance that these two forms of cancer
were due to something other than the normal disease hazards we all
face even though the precise cause could not be identified.
In the jargon of science, all statements have meaning only in such a
statistical sense. Even when making pronouncements in a non-scien-
tific forum, scientists still imply a statistical measure. The confidence
level implied for such statements, however, may be far less than
ninety-five percent. The reason for this is best illustrated by compari-
son with the wide range of verisimilitude associated with other types
of statements. If one equates veracity with confidence level, then
death-bed statements and the sworn statements made in court repre-
sent one end of the spectrum. At the opposite end might be found the
"tall tales" of legends and mythology. Ordinary everyday conversa-
tion, stories in the media, public or official pronouncements, and the
like would be somewhere in betwten.
But for any one of these various situations the statements made
cannot be forced to have a completely arbitrary confidence level;
otherwise their purpose is defeated. In judicial and legislative pro-
ceedings the expected confidence levels are high, but not a perfect
one hundred percent. The confidence level on the low side is deter-
mined by the need for veracity. On the high side it is limited by
procedural rules such as those restricting attempts to intimidate wit-
nesses by threats of perjury sanctions or allowing physical evidence
and original documents to be given greater preference than the testi-
mony of eyewitnesses. Such considerations result in a judicially ac-
ceptable range of confidence levels even though the range is quite
narrow.
By way of contrast, the confidence level of statements made by
scientists can have a broader range. This results from constraints dif-
ferent from those experienced in the legal environment. The lower
limit of the scientist's confidence level may be determined by factors
similar to the courtroom's demand for veracity-the opinion of one's
scientific peers. But on numerous occasions the confidence level may
dip quite low because highly speculative statements are made or the
nature of the data prohibits any higher degree of confidence. Such
1981]
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statements most often are acceptable to the rest of the scientific com-
munity provided they are properly identified.
The upper limit of confidence level for scientific statements may
also be established by pragmatic considerations similar to those used
in a courtroom-such as the amount of time or money available to
perform an investigation. Even at its highest point, the confidence
level cannot normally be set at one hundred percent. Technical con-
siderations, including the precision of the measurements or observa-
tions made, the number of items measured or observed, and so on,
prevent the scientist from achieving one hundred percent confidence.
In any event, when a scientist wishes to make a scientific statement he
or she must also decide where to establish the corresponding confi-
dence level. The scientist must take great care to ensure that the con-
fidence level of any scientific statement is appropriate to the forum in
which it is presented-such as a courtroom-and the audience to
which it is directed-such as the general public. In a similar fashion,
any other person who uses the data in a forum outside the scientific
community must ensure that the audience understands the confi-
dence level and other technical details. Otherwise, statistical limita-
tions acceptable to scientists become the seeds for devisiveness and
confusion in the non-scientific forum. The Love Canal and the
Woburn Dump episodes illustrate this syndrome.
In adjudicating the battle of experts over the Love Canal chromo-
somal study, the EPA ultimately tallied expert opinions as if they
were votes-the opinions of the eight reviewers outweighed that of
the original investigator, and the study was withdrawn. In the case of
the Woburn Dump no one disputed the presence of hazardous indus-
trial waste, the contamination of the wells, and the unusual incidence
of certain types of cancers. Yet different people ascribed differing
levels of causality between these factors. Acrimonious public con-
frontations resulted. At one extreme was the opinion of the minister,
the cancer victims, their families, and many others that all these
things just had to be linked. At the other extreme was the expert
opinion of an independent state agency that linkage could neither be
scientifically proven or disproven with the existing evidence. So,
what is one to do?
These disputes must ultimately be resolved in the courtroom where
appropriate standards of evaluating the evidence must be used.
Should the scientist's range of confidence levels be the rule? Alterna-
tively, perhaps the much narrower range of confidence levels typical
of other judicial and legislative proceedings should apply. Or should
[Vol. 22:317
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we adopt the philosophy of that ultimate courtroom arbitrator (the
jury) that so often votes what itfeels is right rather than what it is told
is logical? The decision is neither simple to make nor obvious in its
outcome. Courtroom conventions used in other areas of law may not
necessarily achieve the most equitable results in the area of environ-
mental protection.
D. Evolution of Environmental Law
Finally, I suggest that beyond refocusing the cost-benefit debate,
developing public support for controls on other hazards, and clarify-
ing the confidence levels expected for scientific opinions used in envi-
ronmental law proceedings, the environmental statutes themselves
should expand even further the principles of skepticism and prudence
that lie behind so many other areas of law. When one considers the
appalling damage already done, then one must consider increasing
prior restraint and accountability for further depredations regardless
of how small, how well intentioned or how beneficial they may be in
the short run.
The five sections that follow seem to me to indicate that such an
evolution has begun. Section I describes how the so-called
"Superfund"' 6 is intended to expand the hazardous waste laws to
clear up the bad practices of the past and allow individual victims
easier recovery for damages suffered. Section II describes how sev-
eral proposed amendments to the Atomic Energy Act 7 intend to
meet pervasive local opposition to the siting of nuclear waste disposal
facilities. Section III describes how the Water Pollution Control
Act' 8 and the Safe Drinking Water Act'9 require changes more ade-
quately to control the ground well injection of industrial wastes and
sewerage into geological structures where they may linger with the
same longevity and virulence of some of the more long-lived radioac-
tive wastes. Section IV describes those parts of the Water Pollution
Control Act2" that require the upgrading of existing (if any) sewerage
systems and how far we still have to go before we no longer literally
16. 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1976).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2259 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
18. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976), as amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-65 (Supp. III 1979).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-j (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
20. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976), as amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-65 (Supp. III 1979).
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foul up other people's backyards. Finally, Section V describes how
these new sewerage systems have, themselves, produced a different
type of waste and how the newer problem of now fouling our own
backyards, rather than someone else's, has not yet been solved.
I. DEVELOPMENTS IN HAZARDOUS WASTE
MANAGEMENT .................................. NANCY JAMES
A. Introduction
One of the foremost environmental problems to emerge in recent
years is the disposal and contaiment of hazardous waste.21 Numer-
ous incidents of spills, leaks, or releases of hazardous substances have
come to light.22 Ensuing investigation has revealed a threat to
human and environmental health of as yet unknown proportions.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that haz-
ardous waste production reached fifty-seven million metric tons in
21. An official definition of "hazardous waste" appears in the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1976). In this article, however,
the term will designate residues containing hazardous substances.
The term "hazardous substances" will be used in this paper to mean "elements,
compounds, mixtures, solutions, and substances which, when released into the envi-
ronment may present substantial danger to the public health or welfare or the envi-
ronment." Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 102 94 Stat. 2767 (to be codified in 42
U.S.C. §§ 9602).
22. One of the most publicized of these incidents is the Love Canal disaster.
From 1942 to 1951, Hooker Chemical Corporation dumped over 21,000 tons of toxic
chemical wastes into an old canal in Niagara Falls, New York. Hooker then covered
the dump and conveyed the canal property to the City Board of Education. The
Board built a school and playground on part of the site and conveyed the rest to the
city and a developer. Some time in 1976, chemicals from the dump began to seep into
the basements of houses encircling the canal. Subsequent studies and tests revealed a
high incidence of miscarriage, birth defects, and other medical problems. Monitoring
confirmed the existence of significant levels of toxic, carcinogenic, and tertogenic sub-
stances inside the houses and in surrounding soil and surface water. See Comment,
Hazardous Waste: EPA, Justice Invoke Emergency Authority, Common Law in Lt1ga.
lion Campaign Against Dump Sites, 10 ENVT'L L. REP. (ELI) 10034, 10035 (1980).
Other examples of toxic pollution are found in the contaminated groundwater of
Woburn, Massachusetts; Dover and Jackson Townships, New Jersey; New Hanover
County, North Carolina; Hardeman county, Tennessee; and Lathrop, California.
Chemical wastes migrated from disposal sites into lakes, rivers, and streams in Mus-
kegon, Michigan; Riverside County, California; West Point, Kentucky; and Saltville,
Virginia. Fires and explosions erupted at disposal sites in Gary, Indiana and Eliza-
beth, New Jersey. See Parisi, Who Pays? Cleaning up the Love Canals, N.Y. Times,
June 8, 1980, § 3, at 1, col. 1. See also Magnuson, The Poisoning ofAmerica, TIME,
Sept. 22, 1980, at 58.
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